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Abstract
We conduct a sensitivity analysis of several estimators related to household income,
to explore how some details of the definitions of the variables concerned influence the
values of the common estimates, such as the mean, median and (poverty) rates. The
purpose of this study is to highlight that some of the operational definitions entail an
element of arbitrariness which leaves an undesirable stamp on the inferences made.
The analyses use both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal (panel) component of the
EU-SILC database.
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1 Introduction
Poverty or deprivation, of an individual or household, is a general and multifaceted
concept that defies a straightforward definition or measurement and elicitation. The
design of every large-scale survey of poverty faces the conflicting demands of collecting
more detail from the subject and keeping the response burden to minimum, so as to en-
courage full cooperation. Definitions of poverty range from conceptual, such as having
insufficient resources for the acquisition and maintenance of items and services regarded
as indispensable for everyday existence, to practical, such as comparing the household
income against a specified standard (the poverty threshold). For a conceptual definition
of poverty, see Sen (1992). The values of variables related to the practical definitions
can be elicited by questionnaire instruments in surveys, or, at least in principle, ex-
tracted from population registers. The variables related to conceptual definitions are
invariably latent, and have to be connected to their manifest versions by models that
are often difficult or impossible to verify. Further difficulties arise when some subjects’
responses involve errors due to imperfect recall or intentional misreporting.
The study of poverty is frequently reduced to the study of income (of an adult
individual or a household), and poverty status is defined coarsely as a dichotomous
variable (being poor or not); Atkinson et al. (2002). Resources acquired, such as
income, are not spent immediately, and demand for them may be uneven. Borrowing
funds can help tie a household over a period of high demand (purchase of expensive
long-lasting goods or a chance accumulation of several expenses), and so the level of
income, whichever way it may be adjusted for household composition, is at best a crude
measure of poverty.
Several papers study the poverty in a single EU country or its part; Delhausse,
Lu¨ttgens and Perelman (1993) in Wallonia, Belgium, Lovillier and Verger (1997) in
France, and Pe´rez-Mayo (2004) in Spain. The European Survey of Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC), Central Statistical Office (2005), is an important source of
data about the income in the countries of the European Union. It is funded by the
European Commission and regulated by the European Parliament and the Council.
These institutions have a vested interest in social protection and they promote policies
conducive to redistribution of wealth. The Survey is conducted since 2003 annually.
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In 2003 it had 12 and in 2005 and 2006 26 participating countries. The designs and
protocols and the questionnaire instruments in the national versions of EU-SILC are
harmonized (made as similar as possible), enabling credible international comparisons.
Lelkes and Zo´lyomi (2008) explore the poverty rates in the countries that participate
in EU-SILC.
The survey has a cross-sectional and a longitudinal (panel) element. At the time of
writing, for most countries, panel data were available only for 2005 and 2006, and for
a few countries also for 2004. Although EU-SILC collects information about housing
condition, health, education and employment, our study is concerned only with income,
and we analyse data only from the cross-sectional survey in 2007 and data from the
panel 2005 – 2006 for all the participating countries.
We are concerned with aspects of definitions of poverty that have an element of
arbitrariness. For example, according to a commonly used definition, a household
is classified as poor if its equivalised income in the studied year is lower than 60%
of the national median equivalised household income. We refer to this cut-off value
as the poverty threshold. In this example, the poverty threshold is country-specific
but, in principle, a single (universal) threshold could also be defined. With such a
threshold, a vast majority of the population in East European countries would be
classified as poor, for example, between 80 and 92 per cent in the Baltic states and
Slovakia (Pichaud, 2000). Country-specific thresholds are more realistic, even if they
distort the comparisons intended for poverty that refers to an absolute level.
The cut-off level of 60% is chosen by convention, as is the way how the total
income is equivalised — adjusted for household composition: one adult member of
the household is counted as 1.0, every other member over 14 years of age as 0.5, and
every child (member aged 14 or younger) as 0.3. For example, a household comprising
three members older and two members younger than 14 years of age has equivalised
household size 1 + 2 × 0.5 + 2× 0.3 = 2.6. If the total income of the household (in a
year) in 52 000 Euro, then its equivalised household income is 52 000/2.6=20 000 Euro.
Although the factors 0.5 and 0.3 are reasonable, it might be difficult to argue against
some similar factors, such as 0.6 and 0.4. Even the composition of income entails some
ambiguities, foremost among them whether the gross or net income should be recorded,
and whether some payments (goods or services received) in kind should be taken into
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account.
We conduct a number of sensitivity analyses which explore the impact of altering
some aspects of the definitions of (national and regional) average income and poverty
rate on the comparisons of the countries or regions. We summarise the sensitivity by
diagrams in which the estimates of the quantities of interest are plotted as functions
of the adjustment.
In the next section, we use the following variables recorded in the EU-SILC database:
1. Household identification (HB030)
2. Personal identification (PB030)
3. Household type (HX060)
4. Total household disposable income (HY020)
5. Total household gross income (HY010), when HY020 is not recorded
6. Household cross-sectional weight (DB090)
7. Longitudinal weight (for two years of duration) (RB062)
8. Region (DB040)
9. Year of birth (RB080)
See Eurostat (2009) for details. Year of birth and Personal identification are recorded
for individuals; the other variables are recorded for households. The database contains
equivalised household income and equivalised household size, but in some analyses we
calculate these by rules that differ from the operational.
The next section deals with estimation of the median income with a range of defini-
tions of the equalised household size (equivalisations). The median income is estimated
for countries and regions of four countries for which at least six regions are recorded
in the database.
Section 3 studies the sensitivity of the poverty rate (percentage of individuals in
poverty) with respect to the poverty threshold and Section 4 applies this approach
to subpopulations of specific interest: single-parent households and children. Section
4
5 studies the sensitivity of the mean poverty gap, defined as the mean shortfall of
equivalised income with respect to the threshold. Section 6 explores a continuum of
estimators that use trimming which have the (weighted) sample mean and the median
as their extremes. Section 7 is concerned with estimation of the rates of transition to
and from poverty and the rates of remaining poor.
2 Median income and equivalised household size
In this section, we study how the comparisons of the median equivalised income of
countries are affected by the definition of the equivalised household size. Suppose a
household has H1 adult and H2 under-age members. Then according to the definition
of the equivalised household size implemented in EU-SILC, the household’s equivalised
size is 1+0.5(H1−1)+0.3H2 . As general alternatives, we consider the equivalisations
1 + (0.4 + 0.005K) (H1 − 1) + (0.25 + 0.0025K)H2 , K = 0, 1, . . . , 80 , (1)
1 + (0.45 + 0.004K) (H1 − 1) + 0.3H2 , K = 0, 1, . . . , 75 . (2)
so that the factors are in the range (0.4, 0.8) for H1 − 1 and (0.25, 0.45) for H2 in
the first set equivalisations. In the second set we alter only the factor of H1 − 1; it
ranges from 0.45 to 0.75. In the first set, the operational equivalisation corresponds
to K = 20, and in the second to K = 12.5. We refer to K as offset. No generality is
lost by associating the first adult member (head) of a household with unity (H0 = 1),
because H0 6= 1 can be compensated by an adjustment of H1 and H2 .
We apply these equivalisations, evaluate the corresponding equivalised household
income for each household in the 2007 national surveys and estimate the national
median equivalised household income. With increasing offset each equivalised income
is reduced or unaltered, but we are concerned only with comparisons of the national
and regional means. Sensitivity is broadly defined as a substantial change in the
(estimated or exact) summary as a result of a small change in the factor; sensitivity
is an undesirable property. It cannot be clinically evaluated unless we specify what
we mean by ‘small’ and ‘substantial’. In our context, this may be an alteration of the
definition of the equivalisation that could equally well have been adopted, except for
the preference for rounded factors of H1 − 1 and H2 .
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national mean, log-mean and median
income with respect to the equivalisation in (1). The means (and the corresponding
standard deviations) and medians are in thousands of Euros, the log-means are in
log-Euros.
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The sensitivity of the national comparisons of mean, log-mean and median income
with respect to altering the factors of H1 − 1 and H2 is summarised in the left-hand
panels of Figure 1. The top two right-hand panels summarise the estimates of the
standard deviations on the linear and log scales and the bottom panel lists the countries
and the numbers of households and individuals in their samples in EU-SILC 2007. The
acronyms (AT, BE, . . . , UK) are used in the margins of the panels. The vertical dashes
indicate the operational definition, K = 20, with factors (1, 0.5, 0.3).
All the population summaries take into account the sampling weights. The mean
of a variable Y is estimated from the sample values (y1 , . . . , yn) with sampling weights
(w1 , . . . , wn) by the ratio estimator
µˆ =
1
w+
n∑
i=1
wi yi ,
and the population variance by
σˆ2 =
1
w+
n∑
i=1
wi (yi − µˆ)2 .
The standard deviation is estimated by the square root
√
σˆ2. Quantile q ∈ (0, 1) of Y
is estimated by the sample quantile, evaluated by the following algorithm. Let y(1) ≤
. . . ≤ y(n) be the values of the equivalised household income sorted into ascending order.
Let w(1), . . . , w(n) be the corresponding (permuted) sampling weights and u(1) = w(1),
u(2) = w(1) + w(2), . . . , u(n) = w(1) + · · · + w(n) = w+ their cumulative totals. The
sample q-quantile of Y is defined as the value y(k) such that u(k−1) < qw+ < u
(k). If
qu(n) = q(k) for some k, then sample quantile is set to (y(k) + y(k+1))/2.
In Section 6, we evaluate the sample (weighted) trimmed mean. For q ∈ (0, 1),
the sample q-trimmed mean can be defined as a generalisation of the sample mean
and sample median. Suppose k and h are such that u(k−1) < qw+ < u
(k) and u(h) <
(1− q)w+ < u(h+1). Then the sample q-trimmed mean is defined as
1
1− 2qw+


(
u(k) − qw+
)
y(k) +
h∑
i=k+1
w(i)y(i) +
{
u(h+1) − (1− q)w+
}
y(h+1)

 .
That is, observations are discarded at either extreme up to the fraction q of the total
weight (qw+), and the weighted sample mean is calculated for the remainder. The
observations at the q and 1− q quantile contribute to the weighted sample mean only
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Figure 2: The q-trimmed mean. An illustration with n = 40 observations and q = 0.1.
partially. An illustration is given in Figure 2. The observations, marked by dots, are
presented in the ascending order. The height at which the dot is printed represents
the value of y. The order numbers are printed underneath in two rows, to avoid
overprinting. For the q fraction of the observations at either extreme, the dots are
small and the order numbers are printed by a smaller font. The weights are presented
by the horizontal segment. The weights of the extreme observations correspond to the
thin part of the segment. Observations 11 and 32 contribute to the 0.1-trimmed mean
only by fractions of their respective weights. The weighted sample mean coincides
with q = 0 trimmed mean (no trimming) and the sample median with q = 0.5 trimmed
mean (full trimming).
The diagrams of the means, log-means and median confirm that income tends to be
highest in the northwestern and lowest in the eastern European countries. The choice
of the scale (linear or log) and using the mean or median, can itself be regarded as an
issue of sensitivity. In all three left-hand panels, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway and
Denmark have the highest values of the summary, but their relative distances differ.
For example, Luxembourg and Iceland have nearly identical values for the mean and
log-mean for all offsets, but for the median they differ appreciably throughout the range
K ∈ (0, 80). The distance of these four countries from the countries next in the order
is relatively greater for the median.
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The eastern European countries have the lowest summaries, and they differ very lit-
tle for the mean and median. However, the estimate of the log-mean for Czech Republic
is greater and for Latvia and Lithuania smaller than for the other four countries.
Total lack sensitivity corresponds to curves that are parallel or concentric, or would
become parallel by a monotone transformation. In particular, such curves do not
intersect (or intersect at a single point), and maintain their relative distances. The
summaries for mean, log-mean and median are quite insensitive. The curves cross in a
few instances (e.g., Luxembourg and Iceland for the mean; Italy and Cyprus for the log-
mean), or they converge, so that they are distant for one offset and close for another
(e.g., Estonia, Poland and Hungary for the log-mean; Ireland and several countries,
including Germany, for the median). However, for a small change in the factors we
have a small changes in the relative magnitudes of the summaries.
The estimates of the standard deviations (right-hand panels of Figure 1) are some-
what more sensitive to the setting of the factors, more so on the linear scale. On the
log scale, Luxembourg stands out; its curve increases throughout the range of offset
quite steeply, whereas for most other countries it is flat or decreasing at a slow rate.
The standard deviation curves for the means closely resemble the curves for the
mean. To a large extent this is due to the log-normal nature of income. The log-
normal distribution, derived by exponentiating the normal distribution N (µ, σ2), has
expectation exp(µ + 1
2
σ2) and variance exp(2µ + σ2) {exp(σ2) − 1}, so the mean and
variance of log-normally distributed variables are strongly positively associated even
when the underlying normals have equal variances. This is borne out by the panel for
the standard deviations on the log scale, which has no apparent association with the
panel for the log-means.
The sensitivity of the five summaries of income for the equivalisation given by (2)
is summarised in Figure 3. The conclusions are very similar to those based on Figure
1. The two sets of equivalisations differ only slightly because in the samples for most
countries there are far fewer children than adults.
2.1 Income in the regions
We study the sensitivity of the summaries of income for regions in four countries, Czech
Republic, Poland, Spain and France, in each of which a division into a relatively large
9
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national mean, log-mean and median
income with respect to the equivalisation in (2).
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number of regions is defined. In the other countries, no regions are identified, or they
are aggregated to define fewer than six regions.
Figures 4 – 7 display the sensitivity curves for the regions of the four countries with
respect to the equivalisation given by (1). The sensitivity curves for the country are
drawn by thick dashes, and the regions are listed in the bottom right-hand panel,
together with their sample sizes.
The diagrams for Czech Republic and Poland are difficult to assess because these
countries have relatively few regions in the data, eight and six, respectively. The
estimates of the mean, log-mean and median are close to being parallel, although
they intersect for regions 5 and 6 (North-East and South-East) and 7 and 8 (Central
Moravia and Moravian Silesia) of the Czech Republic. The summaries for the eight
regions are in the same order in all three left-hand panels, with the capital Prague
(region 1) standing out as having the highest mean household income. The curves for
the median are not smooth because the median is a discontinuous function of the data.
The estimates of the standard deviations are much more sensitive to equivalisation.
The shape of the curve for region 8 differs substantially from the curves for the other
regions, especially for log-mean. The estimated curves for the mean and log-mean
are in some discord — the two regions with highest estimates swap their order for all
offsets, and regions 3, 5 – 8 have similar standard deviations on the linear scale (mean),
but differ substantially on the log scale (log-mean).
The sensitivity curves for the regions of Poland are quite insensitive to the details
of equivalisation, but they are highly sensitive to the choice of the estimator (scale).
Region 1 has by far the highest estimated mean, but its estimated curves for the log-
mean and median do not stand out as much. The ranks of the estimated standard
deviations on the linear and log scales differ substantially.
The sensitivity curves for Spain and France are very close to being parallel for the
estimates of the mean, log-mean and median. The curves for the standard deviations
on the linear scale intersect in many instances, but are close to being parallel. The
curves on the log scale show considerable sensitivity for the French regions and hardly
any for the Spanish regions. The choice of the scale is important for the standard
deviation, but much less so for location (mean, log-mean or median).
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national mean, log-mean and median
income with respect to the equivalisations in (1) for the regions of Czech Republic.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national mean, log-mean and median
income with respect to the equivalisations in (1) for the regions of Spain.
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3 Poverty rate and the threshold
The poverty status, that is, being poor or not, is commonly defined by relating the
household equivalised income to a standard, or threshold, set to a given percentage of
the national median equivalised household income. This percentage is set by convention
to 60%, but there is no profound rationale for this choice. The poverty rate is defined
as the percentage of individuals who are classified as poor. As an alternative, the
poverty rate could be defined as the percentage of households that have equivalised
income lower than the set threshold. We explore how sensitive are the comparisons of
the estimated poverty rates with respect to the percentage that defines the threshold
and whether individuals or households are counted. We refer to these two kinds of
poverty rates as individual- and household-level rates.
The country’s estimated individual-level poverty rates as functions of the threshold
(standard) are plotted in Figure 8. The diagram shows that the comparisons of the
countries are sensitive to the setting of the threshold. For example, Norway has a
relatively low poverty rate with respect to the threshold of 80% (24.9%, the fifth lowest),
and relatively much higher rate with respect to the threshold of 40% (5.1%, the ninth
highest). Ireland has a relatively low poverty rate for 40% threshold, 3.0%, but the
seventh highest poverty rate for 80%, equal to 32.1%. The ranks of the poverty rates
for several other countries differ substantially between the two extreme settings of the
threshold, although some countries have the highest poverty rates for all thresholds
(Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain) and some the lowest (Czech Republic).
Figure 9 displays the sensitivity curves for the estimates of the household-level
poverty rates. The diagram closely resembles its counterpart for individual-level in
Figure 8, although there are some notable differences. (The two diagrams have the same
vertical scale.) For example, the estimated household-level poverty rates in Slovakia
are the second lowest (following Czech Republic) throughout the range of the threshold
percentages 40 – 80%, and the rates for Latvia are uniformly the highest. The estimated
individual-level rates for Poland are among the highest throughout the range, but their
household-level counterparts are near the average throughout. There are substantial
differences between the relative positions of the household- and individual-level poverty
rates for several other countries.
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The estimated household-level poverty rates are uniformly higher than the indivi-
dual-level rates for 20 countries. Of the remaining six countries in EU-SILC, they
are lower for Spain only in a short segment of the lowest threshold percentages (40 –
42%), are lower for 50 – 60% of the range of threshold percentages for Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary, and lower for 90% of the range for Luxembourg, and are lower
throughout the range for Poland. In general, poverty is concentrated among the single-
member and large households, but in most countries there are many more people living
on their own, and the poor among them have a greater impact on the poverty rate.
3.1 Poverty rates in the regions
The sensitivity curves for the individual-level poverty rates in the regions of the four
countries with respect to the thresholds of 40 – 80% of the median household income
are plotted in Figure 10. The regional poverty rates are evaluated with respect to a
common national standard but, of course, the countries have different standards. The
panels have identical vertical scales, so that comparisons could be made also across
the countries. For example, the poverty rates in Spain are in a much wider range
than in the other three countries. The sensitivity curves for one region in France (83,
Corsica) and one in Spain (43, Extremadura) are curtailed, so as to maintain a good
vertical resolution of the plots. For the standard of 80%, the estimated poverty rate
in Corsica is 64.0% and in Extremadura is 57.3%. Some of the estimated curves are
coarse, especially for France and Spain, because the corresponding regions have small
sample sizes. The curve for Corsica is distinctly stepwise constant because the region
is represented in the survey by only 29 households.
The panels show that the regional poverty rates are sensitive to the setting of the
threshold. For example, in Czech Republic, Prague (region 1) has the lowest poverty
rate, except for very low threshold, but the curves for regions 2, 3 and 6 intersect
several times, as do the curves for regions 4 and 8.
For France, region 83 (Corsica) has the highest estimated poverty rate for every
threshold, but the curves for the other regions intersect a great deal. In Spain, region 22
(Navarra) has the lowest poverty rate for every threshold and region 43 (Extremadura)
the highest for thresholds between 55% and 80%. For the lowest thresholds, regions
63 (Ceuta) and 64 (Melilla) have the highest poverty rates, but the poverty rate of the
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of the estimates of the individual-level regional poverty rates
with respect to the thresholds of 40 – 80% median equivalised household income.
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latter in particular is close to the average for high thresholds. Ceuta and Melilla are
two Spanish enclaves in northern Africa, bordering on Morocco. Their population and
sample sizes are much smaller than for the other regions.
The sensitivity curves for the household-level regional poverty rates are plotted
in Figure 11. They are very similar to the individual-level curves in Figure 10, but
some differences can be discerned. For example, region 7 in Czech Republic (Central
Moravia) has appreciably lower individual-level rates than regions 4 and 8 (Northwest
Bohemia and Moravian Silesia) throughout the range of thresholds, but the household-
level rates of these three regions are very similar throughout the range. The esti-
mated household-level poverty rates in France are dispersed less than the corresponding
individual-level rates, and the household-level rates for Corsica stand out more than
the individual-level rates, even for the lowest threshold percentages.
4 Poverty in special subpopulations
Poverty tends to be more prevalent in households with a single parent and poverty is
generally regarded as a more serious social ill when children are affected. In this section,
we study the sensitivity of the poverty rates in these subpopulations with respect to
the setting of the threshold. We reduce the range of thresholds that we explore to
50 – 80%, because otherwise we would observe extreme sensitivity.
The numbers of single-parent households, their percentages in the countries’ sam-
ples, the numbers of individuals in these households, and the numbers of children up
to 14 and 17 years of age are listed in Table 1. Single parents lead between 1.8% and
6.4% of the households. Children up to 14 years of age form between 11.4% and 21.5%
of the countries’ samples; the percentages of children up to 17 years of age are around
4 – 5% higher. The counts and percentages of children up to 15 and 16 years of age,
used in the analysis in Section 4.1, can be approximated quite reliably by interpolation.
The sample sizes for these subpopulations are so small that an analysis for them in
most of the regions would not be meaningful.
Figure 12 displays the sensitivity curves for the individual-level poverty rates of
households led by single parents. The curves intersect and great deal — rates are highly
sensitive to the threshold percentage. Denmark has the lowest estimated poverty rate
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Table 1: The numbers of single-parent households and their members and the numbers
of children and households with them. The percentages relate to the entire samples for
the countries, of households for single parents, and of individuals for children.
Single parents Children up to 14 years Children up to 17 years
Households % Individuals Children % In h-holds Children % In h-holds
AT 352 5.17 883 2836 17.00 1749 3501 20.98 2055
BE 405 6.38 1101 2738 17.67 1584 3395 21.91 1906
CY 99 2.82 270 1830 17.22 1082 2324 21.86 1283
CZ 440 4.55 1113 3116 13.51 2088 3977 17.25 2498
DE 884 6.25 2129 4512 14.23 2877 5749 18.13 3508
DK 221 3.82 571 2820 18.94 1674 3575 24.01 2012
EE 294 5.71 748 1916 13.33 1299 2726 18.97 1679
ES 306 2.48 776 5013 14.49 3333 6174 17.85 3932
GR 104 1.84 266 2053 13.88 1264 2539 17.16 1527
IT 565 2.69 1407 7100 13.45 4779 8693 16.47 5619
FI 366 3.45 982 4701 17.12 2648 6255 22.78 3338
FR 589 5.61 1531 4825 18.62 2825 5937 22.92 3275
HU 380 4.35 961 3214 14.41 2056 4096 18.37 2467
IE 311 5.55 914 2485 18.15 1328 3100 22.64 1569
IS 152 5.30 397 1816 20.99 1111 2243 25.93 1303
LT 207 4.16 512 1486 11.63 1022 2075 16.24 1372
LU 203 5.23 554 2241 21.51 1345 2643 25.37 1518
LV 278 6.22 694 1415 12.62 993 1966 17.54 1292
NL 382 3.74 1005 5547 21.41 3059 6649 25.67 3536
NO 353 5.87 912 2954 19.52 1734 3761 24.85 2099
PL 520 3.64 1355 6623 15.46 4273 8640 20.16 5168
PT 99 2.30 255 1448 12.39 1035 1870 16.00 1276
SE 335 4.66 899 3283 18.11 1979 4354 24.02 2450
SI 241 2.77 614 3253 11.39 2155 4242 14.85 2699
SK 144 2.91 360 1706 11.48 1137 2367 15.93 1481
UK 537 5.79 1493 4013 18.29 2375 4927 22.45 2755
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Figure 12: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national poverty rates for single-parent
households.
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for every threshold percentage, but some countries with high poverty rates at 80%
threshold (the Netherlands and Belgium) have average or lower poverty rates at 50%
threshold and some with low poverty rates at 80% threshold (Latvia and Portugal)
have above average poverty rates at 50% threshold.
The extent of intersecting in Figure 12 can be summarised by the differences of the
ranks of the national poverty rates at the highest and lowest threshold percentages.
If the sensitivity curves did not intersect at all, these differences would vanish for all
the countries. The largest possible difference, ±25, would be attained for a country
that had the highest poverty rate at one extreme threshold percentage and the lowest
at the other. The largest negative rank differences are attained for Portugal (–17),
Spain (–16) and Latvia (–14) and the largest positive differences for the Netherlands
and Belgium (16 each).
The household-level poverty rates are very similar to the individual-level poverty
rates of households led by single parents; details are omitted.
4.1 Child poverty rates
We explore the poverty rates of children by the same approach, but add the age limit
as another factor to the comparisons. It can be disputed whether the age of 15 or 16 is
the appropriate upper limit for qualifying as a child, so we study the sensitivity with
respect to the setting of the limit to 14 – 17 years of age. The poverty rate for children
is meaningfully defined only at the individual level.
The sensitivity curves of the national poverty rates of children with respect to the
the thresholds 50 – 80% are plotted in Figure 13 for the four age limits. The panels
show that the rates are not sensitive to the age limit — the ranks of the countries are
changed only slightly from one panel to another. In contrast, the poverty rates are
quite sensitive to the setting of the threshold. The poverty rates rise steeply with the
threshold percentage for Austria and France (from 8.1% to 37.6% and from 6.4% to
34.7%, respectively, for the age limit of 17 years), and at the slowest rate for Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania (9.4 – 26.8%, 14.5 – 31.2% and 11.4 – 29.4%, respectively). The
rates are highest for all thresholds for Italy (14.2 – 40.0%) and Poland (17.1 – 39.1%)
and lowest for Denmark (5.2 – 20.6%). All the figures in parentheses are quoted for the
limit of 17 years, but they differ from the corresponding figures for the other age limits
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Figure 13: Sensitivity of the estimates of the national poverty rates of children with
respect to the age limit and threshold.
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by not more than 1%, and in many cases by much less. In conclusion, the poverty rates
of children are highly sensitive to the setting of the threshold, even though the rates
for some countries, when related to the others, do not change appreciably. The setting
of the age limit is also unimportant.
Figure 14 presents the same summaries (curves of estimates), but with the four age-
limit curves in the same panel for groups of countries. The age-limit curves are drawn
by different line types, to confirm their insensitivity with respect to the limit. The
countries are split into four panels both to avoid clutter, and to make their comparisons
easier. Thus, Scandinavian countries have relatively low child poverty rates and they
are in a narrow range. The poverty rates in the former Eastern-block countries are
widely spread; they are among the highest (Poland) and the lowest (Slovenia for the
threshold percentage up to 75% and Slovakia for higher percentage). There is a strange
anomaly for Luxembourg, for which the estimated poverty rate steeply increases in a
narrow range at the threshold of about 75%.
We emphasise that the effective sample sizes in these analyses are relatively small,
because only single-parent households (all their members) and households with children
(all members below the age limit) contribute to them, and so the sparseness of the data
contributes to the appearance of high sensitivity. The sample sizes for these analyses
are very small in many regions of France and Spain, so we do not discuss them.
5 Mean poverty gap
The poverty gap is defined as the shortfall of the (equivalised) household income with
respect to the threshold. The poverty gap is equal to zero for households with income
above the threshold. The sensitivity curves for the national mean poverty gaps are
drawn in Figure 15. To improve the resolution of the diagram, the vertical axis is
on the log scale. The mean poverty gaps are highly sensitive to the threshold; the
curves rise most steeply (on the log scale) for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovenia and
Luxembourg, and at the slowest rate for the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark.
Despite the high sensitivity, we can identify groups of countries with distinct ranges
of mean poverty gaps. The former Eastern-block countries have the smallest mean
gaps and, with a few exceptions, the most prosperous countries the largest mean gaps.
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This pattern is an artefact of the (mean) levels of income in the countries, because
a relatively small shortfall with respect to the poverty threshold amounts to a much
greater ‘poverty gap’, as defined earlier, in a country with a high than in one with a
low median household income. In brief, the pattern observed in Figure 15 is to a large
extent a consequence of the misleading definition of the poverty gap.
We address this problem by an alternative definition which assesses the poverty
gap on the log scale. Let Ei be the equivalised income of household i and T the
threshold. Then the poverty gap (on the log scale) is defined as − log(Ei/T ) if Ei < T
and zero otherwise. The mean poverty gap is estimated by the weighted average of
the household-specific poverty gaps. In the averaging, we copy the household’s poverty
gap for every member of the household, and associate it with the individual’s sampling
weight. (The members of a household have identical weights). Of course, we have to
discard households with negative income, for whom the poverty gap is not defined. We
include all households with zero income by adding to the income one cent as a token.
The mean poverty gaps according to this definition, called the mean log-poverty
gaps, are plotted in Figure 16 as functions of the threshold. They show a substantially
different pattern and ranking than in Figure 15. For example, Lithuania and Latvia
have high mean log-poverty gaps but low mean (linear) poverty gaps throughout the
range of thresholds. Norway and Denmark have high linear poverty gaps but rela-
tively much lower log-poverty gaps. The log-poverty gaps increase with the threshold
percentage most steeply for Cyprus and Luxembourg, as in Figure 15, but also for
Portugal, and they increase at the slowest pace for Sweden (unlike in Figure 15). Just
as for the linear poverty gap, the log-poverty gap is also highly sensitive to the setting
of the threshold.
The log-poverty ratios are on the scale of log-ratios (of two monetary amounts).
Their means r are positive and small, in the range 0.00 – 0.12. The negative exponen-
tials exp(−r) are the (weighted) geometric means of the income of poor households
divided by the threshold (and truncated from above by unity). Converted to the per-
centage scale, their complements 100{1 − exp(−r)} are the mean relative shortfalls.
Since the values of r are small, they can be approximated by 100r%, facilitating a
simple interpretation of the mean log-poverty gap: 100r% is the typical poverty gap
(in the country or region) relative to the threshold for poverty.
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We do not argue that the log-poverty gap is more appropriate than the linear
poverty gap, but merely want to point out that the scale on which the poverty gap
is evaluated makes a lot of difference — the poverty gap is sensitive to the scale on
which it is evaluated. The linear poverty gap is strongly associated with the median
household income; a gap of several thousand Euro may be not serious in a country with
high median household income, but it amounts to no income at all in a country with
low median household income. We regard this as an obvious weakness of the linear
poverty gap. The mean log-poverty gap is easy to translate to the percentage scale.
For completeness, Figure 17 displays the mean log-poverty gaps for the four coun-
tries with detailed information about their regions. The four panels have identical
scales. To maintain a good resolution of the plots, the mean log-poverty gap for re-
gion 63 (Ceuta) is curtailed. Its value for the threshold of 80% is 0.43. The poverty
gaps are very sensitive to the setting of the threshold. For Spain and France, we can
identify groups of regions with distinct patterns of dependence of the poverty gap on
the threshold. These differences are notable for Spain in the range 45%– 55% and for
France in the range 40%– 50%, where the poverty gaps intersect a great deal.
6 Trimming: from the mean to the median
Whether to estimate the mean or median, with or without weights, are often regarded
as discrete choices that have to be made in the analysis of income in a population. In
this section, we define a continuum of alternatives that have the mean and median as
their extremes. We propose these alternatives not in order to select one of them, but
to explore how much the estimates depend on the choice made.
As the alternatives, we propose the trimmed mean; see Figure 2. The (weighted)
sample mean corresponds to no trimming and the (weighted) median to 50% trimming.
Trimming 100p% for p ∈ (0, 0.5) at either extreme (tail) of the observed values can
be motivated as a compromise between the mean and the median. In general, the
sample mean is efficient when the studied variable is symmetric and does not have any
outlying values. However, the sample mean is very sensitive to outliers. The sample
median has complementary properties — it is resistant (not sensitive) to outliers, but
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Figure 17: The regional mean log-poverty gaps.
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is less efficient than the sample mean when the variable is close to symmetry and has
no outliers.
We apply trimming, in the form of a sensitivity analysis, to the differences of
equivalised household income in the panel component of EU-SILC for 2005 and 2006.
Only a few countries have data from the two earlier years of the panel. In the analysis,
we include only households that have records for both years and have no recorded
changes in their membership between the two years. The households may have different
equivalised sizes, because a member may become older than the age limit for children,
and his or her contribution to the equivalised size then increases from 0.3 to 0.5.
We define the change of equivalised income as the difference of the equivalised in-
come in the two years (2006 – 2005). The ratio of the two quantities may be considered,
but difficulties would arise for households that have very small (or zero or negative)
income in the ‘denominator’ year 2005. The estimates of the mean difference of equiv-
alised income, as a function of the trimming percentage, are plotted in Figure 18. The
estimated curves are presented in two panels, for the countries with high mean dif-
ference (over 1500 Euro) in the top and for the remainder in the bottom panel. This
arrangement improves the resolution of the diagram. The only curve that straddles
the two panels is for the Netherlands.
A small amount of trimming, say up to 5%, makes a lot of difference for most
countries. The data for Belgium represent an extreme case, because one household had
a very small income in one year and income of several million Euro in the other. The
estimate without trimming is –516.60 Euro (off the scale in the bottom panel), but
even for 0.5% it is 487.80 Euro, and it increases further with greater trimming until
7% (estimate 625.00 Euro), and then it decreases, first very gradually and then with
a somewhat greater gradient. The median difference (50% trimming) for Belgium is
497.70 Euro. The estimated curve for the Netherlands has a very different shape; it
decreases throughout the range of trimming, so that without trimming it would appear
to have had one the highest increases in income, whereas with high trimming, or for
the median, it has a relatively low difference (263.00 Euro). Even though the curves
for the countries with the highest mean differences (top panel of Figure 18) are close
to being parallel, except for very small trimming (up to about 3%), the estimates are
highly sensitive to the extent of trimming.
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respect to trimming.
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The countries with high mean income tend to have high differences (although
Cyprus, the UK, Austria and Germany are important exceptions), and so some form
of scaling, such as dividing by the mean income may be useful. However, that would
not alter our conclusion about the sensitivity of the estimates, because the shapes of
the sensitivity curves would be changed only slightly.
The sensitivity of the estimates of the mean differences in income in the regions
of the four countries with the available information is summarised in Figure 19. The
sensitivity curves are curtailed at 5% because the estimates are extremely sensitive
to trimming for small trimming percentage, and some of the panels would have to be
drawn with very wide scales. Even after curtailing the plots at 5%, we cut off the
vertical axis for France at −500 Euro, so that curves for two regions, 23 (Haute Nor-
mandie) and 83 (Corsica), are not displayed fully. Their estimates with 5% trimming
are −1675.1 and −931.0 Euro, respectively, and the estimates are extremely sensitive
for them even for much higher trimming percentages.
The estimates for the regions of Czech Republic and Poland are a bit less sensitive
with respect to the trimming, but the choice of trimming, or between the mean and
median, should be taken with care, because most estimation curves have wide ranges
of values and are distictly not parallel. For example, region 1 (Prague) has by far the
highest estimated mean increase in Czech Republic, but its estimated median differs
only slightly from the estimated medians of three other regions. Similarly, region 1 in
Poland (Lodz-Mazowieckie) has a relatively high estimated mean but nearly the lowest
estimated median. Small sample sizes exacerbate the sensitivity of the estimates; that
is why the estimates for the few regions of Czech Republic and Poland are less sensitive
than the estimates for the regions of Spain and France. However, other factors that
are much more difficult to pinpoint also contribute to sensitivity.
7 Transitions from and to poverty
Time spent in poverty is studied because long-term poverty has much more serious
consequences than being poor intermittently and for only short periods separated by
relative prosperity. The study of this aspect of poverty requires extensive data about
income in periods of time shorter than one year. The available data permit us only
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Figure 19: Sensitivity of the mean difference of income between 2006 and 2005 with
respect to trimming in the regions of four countries.
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to study the prevalence of switches between the poverty states from 2005 to 2006.
Thus, we set the poverty thresholds for the two years and estimate the percentages
of individuals (or households) who were classified as poor in 2005 and as not poor in
2006, and vice versa. These estimates are obtained for threshold percentages in the
range 50 – 80%. The percentage of individuals who are classified as poor in both years
is also of interest. For brevity, we refer to it as persistence of poverty. We reduce
the sample to the households that have the same composition in the two years. If a
member was classified as a child in one year and as an adult in the other, then the
equivalised household size is altered, and this is reflected in the equivalised household
income.
The transition rates are defined as the percentages of individuals who are in par-
ticular poverty states in the two studied years. The denominator for these percentages
is the population size (or the total weight of the sample). An alternative definition is
based on the conditional percentages, in which, for example, the transition rate from
poverty (in 2005) to prosperity (in 2006) is defined as the percentage of individuals who
made the transition among those who where classified as poor in 2005. To distinguish
the two kinds of transition rates, we refer to them as unconditional and conditional.
The sensitivity curves for the unconditional transition rates between the poverty
states and for being poor in both years 2005 and 2006 are plotted in Figure 20. In
the left-hand panel, the estimated percentages of those who were classified as poor
in 2005 and as not poor in 2006 are plotted in the top (positive) part of the panel,
and the estimated percentage of those who made the transition in the other direction
in the bottom (negative) part. A modicum of smoothing is applied to the estimated
curves because the original estimates for some countries are quite erratic and have
sudden changes for several threshold percentages. The curves tend to increase for both
kinds of transition. However, even after smoothing, they are decreasing or have sudden
bumps in several short intervals.
The curves intersect a great deal, so as indicators of change in the poverty status
they are highly sensitive to the threshold percentage. The cause of the sensitivity
is that estimation relies on small numbers of transitions and observations with large
weights exercise unduly strong influence on the estimates. Despite the sensitivity,
we can identify countries that have high prevalence of transitions in both directions
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Figure 20: Sensitivity of the prevalence of transitions and of persistent poverty with
respect to the threshold percentage.
(Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Spain), and those that have low prevalence
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden).
The right-hand panel displays the estimated percentages of individuals who were
classified as poor in both years. Of course, these percentages increase with the thresh-
old. Sensitivity gradually decreases with the threshold percentage. For the threshold
percentage below 50% they are very small and, being based on small effective sample
sizes, are highly sensitive.
The sensitivity curves for the conditional transition rates are plotted in Figure 21.
The left-hand panel is the ‘conditional’ version of the top part of the left hand-panel in
Figure 20. The two sets of curves differ substantially, because the denominators for the
conditional rates depend on the estimated poverty rates in 2005, and these vary a great
deal. The unconditional rates tend to increase with the threshold percentage, whereas
the conditional rates tend to decrease. The estimates of the conditional rates are more
39
50 60 70 80
20
40
60
Threshold (%)
Le
av
in
g 
po
ve
rty
 (%
)
IS
SK
UK
NLDEIE
DKATCZ BEEEHU
SEES
CY FRPLLV NO
SI
IT FIGRLT
PT
LU
SK
DE
AT
HUESUK
LT LV PLFRBENLEEIS
CZSI GRITNO
CYIE
PTLUDKFI SE
50 60 70 80
0
5
10
Threshold (%)
En
te
rin
g 
po
ve
rty
 (%
)
ESLVGR
UK
ITHU PL
FRDE EE
LULT SKATCY
ISIEBE PT
CZ
SE SIFINO NLDK
HUES
PLLV
UK
SKAT
GRLU
FRDE
IELT IT ISCY
EE
SICZNLBE
FI
PT
NO
SE
DK
Figure 21: Sensitivity of the conditional transitions rates with respect to the threshold
percentage.
unstable, have more and bigger deviations from the trend and are more sensitive to
the threshold percentage. The countries’ ranks of the conditional and unconditional
transition rates for leaving poverty are very weakly related. For example, Iceland has
the highest conditional rate of leaving poverty for threshold percentages up to 55%, but
the corresponding unconditional rates are among the lowest. The unconditional rates
for Norway are among the lowest, but the conditional rates are only slightly below the
average.
The conditional and unconditional rates of transition to poverty are closely related
and the ranks or relative positions of the countries in the corresponding diagrams are
very similar. The reason for this similarity is that the rates of not being poor are much
greater numbers than the rates of being poor, and so little difference arises between
using those not being poor or the entire sample as the basis. In contrast, the two sets
of rates for leaving poverty differ substantially because the poverty rates are relatively
small numbers.
Similar conclusions are arrived at for the unconditional and conditional transition
and persistence rates at the household level; details are omitted. For persistence rates,
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it is not necessary to consider conditional rates because they are equal to the comple-
ment of the conditional transition rates for leaving poverty.
8 Discussion
Income and poverty status are basic variables in many studies of the economic well-
being of a population. The definitions of such variables entail several conventions that,
even though reasonable, do not have a profound scientific basis and have been set
mainly for the sake of uniformity, comparability and convenience. We explored the
impact of some of these conventions, such as the percentage of the median household
income used as the poverty threshold and equivalisation of the household size, and
identified several weaknesses in the definitions. If only slightly different conventions
were adopted they would lead to substantially different conclusions (estimates) even
about very simple population summaries, such as mean income and the poverty rate.
This is to be expected, because poverty as a concept is on a continuum, and its defi-
nition as a dichotomy (Poor/Not poor) is adopted for mainly operational convenience.
However, comparisons of estimates are altered substantially with small changes in these
conventions.
Our perspective is not to revise the operational definitions, because there is no set-
ting of the conventions that, by some credible objective criteria, is more valid than any
other. Instead, we propose to accompany every substantive analysis with a sensitivity
analysis which would repeat the former for several plausible changes of the conventional
settings. If the results agree (or differ insubstantially) for all the settings, we have the
common result as an unequivocal conclusion. Otherwise any single conclusion would
be problematic and selecting one at the expense of the others amounts to a denial of
uncertainty, or it has to be qualified by the selection made, thus limiting its relevance.
Sensitivity analysis is a generic term for a statistical exploration of the impact of
settings and inputs on the conclusions. The settings are not necessarily captured or
reflected in the data that are submitted to the analysis; in our case such an analysis
entails generating ‘new’ (alternative) data for the outcome. By its nature, sensitivity
analysis is never complete, because often there is a myriad of factors that could be
explored. This calls for intelligent selection (prioritising) of the factors that should
41
be explored. Ignoring them all and regarding every operational definition or setting,
however well established, as optimal is a poor solution.
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